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―But what is useless can nevertheless be a power—a power in the 
rightful sense.‖ 
--Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics 
INTRODUCTION 
 To paraphrase the opening line of a Henry David Thoreau essay, I 
wish in this essay to speak a word for leisure, for human dignity, and for 
freedom as opposed to amusement and occupation.  Like the philosopher and 
wilderness trekker from Concord, I want to make an extreme assertion: We 
have aimed at usefulness long enough, now let us pursue a measure of 
uselessness.  Doing so will not be easy, because in our technological age 
―uselessness‖ is thought a sin against the virtue of ―practicality.‖1  Thoreau 
knew the importance of leisure and understood that, without it and its fruits, 
human life is hollow, infected with ennui, and marked by ―quiet desperation.‖  
Consequently, he served as the ―inspector of snowstorms and rainstorms,‖ so 
he would have leisure to ―improve his soul‘s estate.‖2  Unlike many of us in the 
modern academy – students, professors, and administrators – Thoreau had 
firsthand acquaintance with the value of leisure because he was informed by an 
intellectual tradition that privileged liberal learning.  Although this tradition 
reaches at least as far back as Plato and Aristotle, it is increasingly under attack 
in the modern university, even by those of us who are its would-be defenders.  
The reason is simple – our technological society and its representatives place 
too high a premium on the values of utility, efficiency, and productivity.  
Consequently, even leisure must be dedicated to production. 
 One cannot promote liberal education and ignore the fundamental 
tension that exists between leisure and utility.  ―To aim at utility everywhere,‖ 
Aristotle writes, ―is utterly unbecoming to high-minded and liberal spirits.‖3  
Thus, my plea for leisure, for ―uselessness,‖ is a plea for the revitalization of 
liberal education.  It is not enough to ask, as does Nietzsche‘s ―last man,‖ 
―What is love?  What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?‖ and then 
―blinks.‖4  The ―last man‖ wants what is useful, what affords comfort and 
security, so when he entertains the fundamental questions pertaining to human 
existence, he does so without passion and conviction.  These questions mean 
nothing to him, so he ―blinks‖ as though slumber is never far off.  But, perhaps 
the blink signifies more than just fatigue and boredom. According to Martin 
Heidegger, for instance, the blink indicates that a ―glittering deception‖ has 
been put into play – one which by tacit agreement of everyone involved 
remains unquestioned.   
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The association of liberal education with leisure and with uselessness 
is hardly a new idea.
5
  The charge of uselessness is usually a disparaging one, 
but it has also been employed to underscore the non-utilitarian nature of liberal 
education.  One of the most comprehensive treatments to date of liberal 
education‘s uselessness is Daniel Cottom‘s Why Education is Useless.  
According to Cottom, the uselessness of higher education ―. . . emerges from 
the despair that eats away at our satisfactions and that questions even our 
greatest and most pleasing certainties.‖6  Liberal education is useless in the 
same manner that genuine thinking is useless: it disrupts, it challenges, it 
undermines, in a word, it questions.  It serves as a foil against what Cottom 
calls the ―tyranny of stupidity.‖ Thus, the uselessness of liberal learning is its 
―immeasurable value‖ and the reason why it should be acknowledged and 
embraced by the academy.   
 More recently, Stanley Fish has challenged Cottom‘s conclusion as a 
―back-door form of justification‖ for liberal education.  If liberal education is 
an intrinsic value, it requires no justification beyond itself.  ―An unconcern 
with any usefulness to the world is the key to its distinctiveness, and this 
unconcern is displayed not in a spirit of renunciation . . . but is a spirit of 
independence and the marking of territory.‖7  Despite some of his deliberately 
provocative assertions, one can nonetheless appreciate Fish‘s insistence on the 
need to differentiate liberal learning from education dedicated to external ends.  
Liberal learning is characterized by inutility—Fish‘s word—or uselessness, 
which can be traced back to Aristotle‘s view that philosophy ―exists for its own 
sake.‖8  The pursuit of such knowledge requires leisure and is for the sake of 
leisure. This does not preclude the fact that such knowledge may be utilized to 
achieve any number of desirable ends, but it does mean that it has a value that 
is independent of those ends.  
 But how should one respond to the inevitable query from today‘s 
student, ―What can I do with it (liberal education)?‖ Taking a clue from 
something Heidegger says about philosophy, one might respond by saying, 
―What can I do with it?‖ is the wrong question to ask.  The right question is, 
―What can philosophy (or, liberal education) do with me, if I engage in it?‖  
This view targets those few students who can and will avail themselves of the 
opportunity to find out, because at least those few will experience the freedom 
associated with liberal learning and will need no further justification. As for 
those other students who do not enjoy the luxury of leisure today nor have 
future prospects of it, it is precisely with such students in mind that I am saying 
professors of the liberal disciplines should teach their disciplines as ends-in-
themselves, rather than as means to external ends.  Liberal education will not 
disappear from the academic scene, but we may be in danger of reverting to the 
elitism that was inherent in the Ancient distinction between the liberal and 
servile arts.  In The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of 
the Humanities, Frank Donoghue calls attention to a disturbing trend whereby 
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―the liberal arts education will increasingly become a luxury item, affordable 
only to the privileged.‖9 
Those not privileged will still be exposed to traditional liberal disciplines–
history, literature, and philosophy, for instance–but for the sake of work. This 
is untarnished elitism and, if it comes to pass, will leave the majority of 
university graduates in the position of ―slaves‖ who exist for the sake of others.  
They will be paid for their labor, but they will nonetheless exist for the sake of 
the marketplace.  The measure of their value will be reduced to what they can 
do, not what they are.   
The struggle within the academy between vocationally oriented 
education and liberal education has deep historical roots.  What is unique to the 
contemporary scene is not that the proponents of liberal education are losing 
ground, for they have been losing ground for a long time.  Hunger, after all, is a 
stronger, more compelling motivator than wonder and contemplation.  What is 
prominent in the academy today is that the would-be defenders of liberal 
learning are now, either surreptitiously or unwittingly, giving ground.  This is 
precisely what we are doing whenever we advance the cause of liberal 
education by rendering it useful, whenever we succumb to the language of 
utility and spell out a litany of liberal learning outcomes, including everything 
from the development of moral character to effective citizenship, and, let us not 
forget, the ability to think critically.   
 The purpose of this essay is to encourage liberal educators to stop 
giving ground, that is, to stop recasting liberal learning as a utilitarian activity 
in order to meet society‘s demand for utility and productivity.  There will 
always be people in the academy who will give lip-service to liberal education 
and then blink, and, although it is important to call attention to their blink, it is 
more important that we go about our business of introducing students to liberal 
learning writ large; that is to say, liberal learning for its own sake and not for 
the sake of utilitarian ends.  If we busy ourselves with only the latter, our 
students may learn to write, think critically, and communicate effectively, but 
they will not have access to the only real evidence there is for the intrinsic 
value of liberal learning, namely, a cast of people whose lives have been and 
continue to be informed by liberal education.  In order to demonstrate the 
intrinsic value of liberal learning for our students, we ourselves must embrace 
and model it in our deeds, and this means to acknowledge its uselessness and to 
cease repackaging it for the marketplace.   
 While much of the history of our topic has been covered by Cottom 
and others, consideration of some crucial historical shifts will help us 
understand how we arrived where we are today.  Throughout history, 
academics in general and liberal educators in particular have had to fend off 
demands that liberal education be made useful.  But history of the topic also 
teaches that despite the tension between vocational and liberal learning, the 
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representatives of liberal education have always had a place at the table.  Until 
now, that is.  If Donoghue is correct, ―professors of the humanities have 
already lost the power to rescue themselves.‖10  Perhaps, but while we still have 
a place in the modern university we should, as Fish would say, do our jobs.  We 
should represent our disciplines and not some utilitarian reinterpretation of 
them.  Our students deserve nothing less. 
LEISURE AND THE UNIVERSITY 
  Leisure is inseparable from the idea of a university.  Indeed, the words 
leisure and university are virtually synonymous, as the German philosopher 
Josef Pieper reminds us.  The Greek term for leisure is schole, and it is the 
etymological root of the Latin word schola and the German word schula, both 
of which, of course, mean school.
11
  It is not surprising then that, for Plato and 
Aristotle, as well as for their medieval counterparts, leisure is associated not 
with inactivity but with the highest form of activity, that is, with speculative or 
contemplative thought. Thus, the contrast to leisure is not activity per se, but 
occupation or employment.  For this reason, leisure must also be distinguished 
from play and amusement, inasmuch as they are in service to occupation and 
work rather than contemplation.  As Aristotle puts it, ―We can hardly fill our 
leisure with play. . . . Play is a thing to be chiefly used in connexion with one 
side of life—the side of occupation.‖12   
 A liberal education informs a person in the proper use of leisure.  
Looking to Aristotle once more, we read in the Politics that ―. . . there are some 
branches of learning and education which ought to be studied with a view to 
the proper use of leisure in the cultivation of the mind.  It is clear, too, that 
these studies should be regarded as ends in themselves, while studies pursued 
with a view to an occupation should be regarded merely as means and matters 
of necessity.‖13  Studies that aim at occupation are intended to put one in 
possession of things, while the liberal studies and leisure are intended to put 
one in possession of oneself.  The distinction is a crucial one because things 
have merely a market value, a price, while selfhood and personal authenticity 
have intrinsic worth and are, therefore, alone deserving of esteem.     
 Liberal education, as the word liberal suggests, is intimately connected 
with the idea of personal freedom.  For the Greeks, liberal education was 
thought to be suitable for free men (and women), while training in the 
mechanical arts or skills was suitable for those whose lives were defined by 
work.  The medieval thinkers, even though they dignified work in a way that 
Aristotle and Plato did not, nonetheless continued to assign priority to what 
they called the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) as opposed to the active 
life (vita activa).  The contemplative life is superior and freer because it is 
neither subordinated nor dedicated to the acquisition of inferior external ends.  
For Thomas Aquinas, the distinction between the liberal arts and the servile 
arts parallels the distinction between contemplative and active life and draws 
on the distinction between intellectus and ratio.
14
  Intellectus, or intuitive 
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knowing, is a form of intellectual seeing; it is receptive insofar as it receives, 
beholds, and contemplates the highest objects of knowledge, which include the 
True, the Good, and the Beautiful.  In contrast, ratio, or discursive reason, 
judges and assesses the matters under consideration, collects and interprets 
data, draws conclusions from premises, etc.  Ratio is the basis of scientific 
knowledge (scientia) and lends itself, by extension, to technological 
application, while intellectus is the ground of wisdom (sapientia).   
 With the technological interpretation of modern science, René 
Descartes, like his contemporary Francis Bacon, challenged the ancient and 
medieval view that the highest form of knowledge—that which contributed to 
human excellence—was knowledge for its own sake. In the Discourse on 
Method (1637), Descartes articulates the principal aim of a scientific method 
that conjoined him with Bacon and compelled him to reject scholasticism and 
Aristotelianism.  He held in ―esteem,‖ he says, the study of ancient literature, 
languages, and theology, and, less positively, philosophy but views all of them 
as having the same underlying deficiency—they all involve speculations that 
lead to unusable results.  The proper end of science is useful knowledge, not 
erudition.  Indeed, the reason he gives for publishing his thoughts on method is 
that his method of scientific investigation, unlike the speculative philosophy of 
the past, would make it ―possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in 
life.‖15  There is no denying that Descartes was correct to condemn the nearly 
slavish adherence to Aristotelian science that was common at the time, and his 
primary goal of wanting, among other things, to ―free‖ humanity from 
―maladies of body and mind‖ and ―infirmities of age‖16 is likewise laudable. 
Unfortunately, the success of his philosophical program also gave rise to an 
attitude that has probably done as much to imprison as it has to free us.  We 
cling more tenaciously than ever to the illusion of our own omnipotence.  This 
attitude is glaringly evident in Descartes‘ claim that his method would give rise 
to a practical philosophy that would render human beings the ―masters and 
possessors of nature.‖  This, of course, is sheer hubris, and, even if we allow 
that modern technology has indeed given us control over nature, without the 
moral anchor implicit in the ancient notion of reality, we are denied the means 
whereby we can regain a modicum of control over our own power to control.
17
 
As regards our power to control our exercise of power, we have become 
increasingly powerless.  Thus, the expansion of human power over nature is 
accompanied by a contraction of our being and intrinsic worth.  What is 
occluded is precisely what gives human beings their worth and dignity, namely, 
the contemplative and receptive capacities of the human intellect.  
 But we are getting ahead of ourselves.  Despite Descartes‘ and 
Bacon‘s technological interpretations of science, liberal education continued to 
be associated with the idea of human freedom during and after the 
Enlightenment, for it was believed that only those who can think well and think 
for themselves enjoy genuine freedom.  What good is freedom from physical 
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constraints and maladies if the mind is shackled due to a lack of cultivation and 
a preoccupation with mundane affairs?  But, more recently, the narrative of 
emancipation, of freedom, has been challenged by postmodernism.  Even here, 
though, it is noteworthy that Jean-Francois Lyotard‘s observations in The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979) are descriptive rather 
than proscriptive.  Lyotard‘s credentials as a postmodern thinker 
notwithstanding, his break with the tradition, if one may call it such, retains 
significant ties with the tradition.  For example, Lyotard acknowledges, but 
does not endorse, the view that knowledge is no longer regarded as an end in 
itself:  ―The question (overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist 
student, the State, or institutions of higher education is no longer ‗Is it true?‘ 
but ‗What use is it?‘. . . ‗Is it saleable?‘ . . . ‗Is it efficient?‘ . . . What no longer 
makes the grade is competence as defined by other criteria true/false, 
just/unjust, etc.—and, of course, low performativity in general.‖18   
 It is worth noting that, even though Lyotard does not buy into the 
cosmology and metaphysics of the ancient and medieval philosophers, he also 
does not entirely abandon the element of receptivity that accompanied their 
notion of intellectus, which, as we said, is the highest function of the mind.  
―Thinking,‖ he writes, ―like writing or painting, is almost no more than letting 
a givable come towards you.‖19 Or, again, ―In what we call thinking the mind 
isn‘t ‗directed‘ but suspended. You don‘t give it rules.  You teach it to 
receive.‖20  To think is to suffer—to be receptive to that which shows itself, 
rather than trying to master and control it. 
FREEDOM AND THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN BEINGS 
 The central role of the liberal or liberating arts is to free us, if only for 
short periods of time, from mundane affairs, from the need to subordinate our 
lives, wills, and intellects to external demands, from the need—whether real or 
merely felt—to place ourselves under the sway of the marketplace in order to 
make a living.  After all, human excellence requires more than the material 
ends that are procured through labor, however important such ends may be in 
their own right.  We are reminded of this in Scripture when we read in the Old 
and New Testaments that ―man does not live by bread alone.‖  It is to address 
our higher intellectual and spiritual needs that a Sabbath is necessary, a day of 
leisure, during which time we can distance ourselves from the menial tasks and 
affairs of human existence.  For the same reason, ancient temples were set-off 
and separated from places that were dedicated to farming, grazing, and 
supplying the material necessities of life.  Temples were for the veneration of 
the gods.  From a practical point of view, such sites constituted wasted or 
useless spaces.  For similar reasons, Plato‘s Academy and Aristotle‘s Lyceum 
were also ―unproductive‖ places.  Indeed, in Plato‘s Republic, Adeimantus 
condemns philosophers because they are ―useless to the many.‖21  Philosophy, 
as it is sometimes said, ―bakes no bread.‖  Nor do history, poetry, literature, 
and the natural and social sciences, at least not insofar as they participate in and 
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form the core of a liberal arts education.  What makes an art or science liberal 
or illiberal is the end at which it aims rather than the subject matter per se.
22
 
 Thomas Merton is correct when he laments that, despite all our talk of 
freedom, ―our civilization is strictly servile.‖  Why?  Because our technological 
culture is oriented ―exclusively to the useful.‖23  In the end, even human beings 
are valued not because of what they are but because of their usefulness, which 
can be measured and quantified, but not esteemed.  ―It is by means of 
technology that man the person, the subject of qualified and perfectible 
freedom, becomes quantified, that is, becomes part of a mass—mass man—
whose only function is to enter anonymously into the process of production and 
consumption.‖24  Merton is not suggesting that we should jettison modern 
technology; even Merton believes that ―a technological society might 
conceivably be a tranquil and contemplative one.‖25  However, his italics 
indicate that he was not particularly sanguine about the likelihood of it coming 
to pass anytime soon, and for good reason.    
 Before Merton, Heidegger expressed similar concerns when he argued 
that modern technology reduces everything—including persons—to the status 
of ―standing reserve.‖  From the perspective of modern technology, human 
beings are resources, and the activity of thinking aims at nothing more than 
calculation, manipulation, and production.  Even thinking becomes useful and 
loses its meditative character, which Heidegger tries to recapture with the 
German word Gelassenheit, to let be, to contemplate, to listen rather than to 
challenge, exploit, and manipulate.  Human beings, however, are contemplative 
beings—something that is largely ignored in modern academic institutions 
where productivity and utility are the fundamental values.  Education and 
technology are now a couplet, and what is almost never broached is the 
possibility that technology fosters an attitude that is contrary to the proper end 
of liberal education.  Merton‘s antidote against this state of affairs is the 
rediscovery of the ―primary usefulness of the useless.‖  But who will 
administer this antidote in the modern university, if not those who profess the 
liberal disciplines?  
 To make manifest the essence of a phenomenon, the 
phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl employed the method of free 
eidetic variation, which harks back to the Greek word eidos or idea.
26
  Loosely 
applying the eidetic method to the notion of a university, we can, for instance, 
imagine it stripped of its field house and on-campus housing yet it remains a 
university, stripped of professional and applied studies yet it remains a 
university.  But, if we imaginatively strip it of the liberal studies, the idea of a 
university evanesces.  We cannot imagine a university without mathematics, 
without physics, without history, literature, philosophy, and the other liberal 
arts.  This does not mean that professional and technical training are 
unimportant, but it does mean that they are not essential to the idea of a 
university. 
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 In John Henry Newman‘s collected lectures on university education, 
The Idea of a University, he uses the word ―idea‖ to underscore his expression 
of what is essential for a university education, in other words, what a university 
cannot be without and still remain a university.  Newman‘s Idea of a University 
addresses many of the issues I have been discussing, e.g., that there is an 
essential difference between liberal and servile knowledge, that liberal 
knowledge involves contemplation and thus requires leisure, that liberal 
knowledge is its own end, and finally, that ―A university is . . . an Alma Mater, 
knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.‖27  In 
short, a university is not a business, and educators are not production managers.  
The proper function of a university is liberal education, which means once 
again that its end—its proper end—is the cultivation of the intellect for its own 
sake.  
 It would be naive to think that the educational climate in Newman‘s 
day was significantly different from our own.  In fact, The Idea of a University 
explicitly acknowledges and responds to those of his contemporaries who 
believed, as many people do today, that university education should ―issue in 
some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. . . . they argue that 
where there is a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind.‖28  
This, of course, is the performativity equation to which Lyotard calls attention.  
These same people, according to Newman, go on to ask ―what is the real value 
in the market of the article called ‗Liberal Education?‘‖  If a meaningful 
existence could be had by means of productivity and consumption alone, we 
might well abandon leisure altogether and relieve ourselves (and our students) 
of the burdens of liberal education.  But, if thoughtful people can agree that the 
good life at its best requires the fruits of leisure and the liberal studies, then 
what?  How do we get past the myopia of the technological world view and the 
―glittering deception‖ that asserts the value of a liberal education, while 
justifying it in terms of occupation?  
CONCLUSION 
 Of course, we can no more go back to Newman‘s university than we 
can to the scholastic institutions of the Middle Ages or to the Lyceum of 
Aristotle, but, fortunately, doing so is  unnecessary for genuine participation in 
the intellectual tradition that privileges leisure and liberal education.  
Participation requires respect for the past, but participation does not mean 
recovering and preserving the past as though it were a museum piece.  On the 
contrary, one must appropriate, transform, and advance what has been.  A 
tradition is a living thing.  The modern university, insofar as it brings together 
and pursues what Newman and others considered conflicting educational goals, 
must find a way to accommodate the internal conflicts and tensions that arise 
when the modern university seeks to provide undergraduates with liberal 
education, while also contributing to the advancement of knowledge through 
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research and publication and satisfying the demands (I hesitate to say ―needs‖) 
of our contemporary, technological society. 
 Interestingly, Newman, I believe, was well aware of the tension that 
would be generated by these divergent goals and sought to circumvent the 
problem by proffering the idea of a university that would be free from the 
demands of the marketplace. ―Performativity‖ would not be the measuring stick 
of Newman‘s ideal university.  The tension that follows from the conflicting 
demands of research and teaching is put to rest by Newman by dedicating the 
university to the ―diffusion‖ of knowledge, rather than to its ―advancement.‖  
According to Newman, ―to discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are 
also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person.  He, 
too, who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers is 
unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new.‖29   
 For better or worse, American universities have accepted the 
challenge of embracing three divergent interests—teaching, research, and 
professional training, along with public service—and, as a result, it is 
imperative that we remain mindful of the tension that this threefold task entails 
and maintain a proper balance.  From an administrative perspective, the 
absence of tension may be desirable because it would make the whole more 
manageable, but it would also be a sure sign that all of the interests of the 
university have, in fact, given way to and become dominated by one interest—
the interest of the market-oriented, technological society that it serves.  Nor is 
this reorientation of the university a phenomenon that is unique to the United 
States.  Jacques Ellul, one of the most trenchant critics of modern technology, 
laments that the modern university—by which he means the modern French 
university—has become a technical school, where students prepare to fulfill a 
position in technological society.
30
  In such an environment, the humanities are 
considered unproductive unless they are professionalized and/or brought under 
the umbrella of technology.  An oft-mentioned fear is that the university will 
vanish unless it responds to the demands of technology and the market.  
Perhaps it is time for those who still believe in the value of liberal education to 
respond that the university is already in its death throes when it abandons the 
liberal arts and sciences except for their role as marketable resources.  But 
almost no one in the academy would dismiss liberal education out of hand, so it 
is not enough to listen when members of the academy praise liberal learning, 
one must also watch their eyes to make certain they do not blink.  For the sake 
of the university, let us hope that there remain a courageous few who are 
willing to embrace ―uselessness‖—a few who still hold and embody the 
conviction that one is never more active and engaged than when one is doing 
―nothing,‖31 that is to say, when one is thinking. 
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